Introduction
In this article we show how in cities diverse citizenship practices can yield a combination of two citizenship agendas, one belonging to the sphere of social rights and the other to the sphere of political participation and democratic values.
The article joins previous debates published in this Journal concerning the conceptualization of citizenship beyond the nation state. More specifically, this is a contribution to a body of research into urban citizenship and aims to provide nuances to general propositions concerning citizenship beyond the nation state.
A substantive body of studies on citizenship and the welfare state follow the legacy of Marshallian citizenship with its focus on social rights (Esping Andersen, 1990; Korpi, 1989; Taylor-Gooby, 2009; Revi, 2014) . However, with the transformation of the welfare state (reducing its redistributive capacity) the conditionalization of claims is challenging the principle of equal rights for all citizens (Faist, 2013; Somers, 2008) . The resilience of the welfare state in supporting social citizenship has been uneven with the relative triumph of neo-liberal ideas over social democratic models (Taylor-Gooby, 2002) . Moreover, in recent years under the pressure of fiscal austerity the reduction and privatization of public services have left new or inadequately met social needs in their wake.
In a different vein, studies have signalled the need to re-think the main assumptions behind citizenship in contemporary and globalized societies, where transnational social flows and state re-shaping are leading to new social, cultural and political loyalties. This raises the question what it means to be a member of a polity (Bauböck & Guiraudon, 2009; Kivisto and Faist, 2007) . At the same time it shows that the quality of citizenship is mediated by cultural differences and by fragmentation of formal incorporation in a polity (Isin & Turner, 2002; Lister, 2007; Morris, 2009; Soysal, 2012) . This rich literature takes us beyond of the scope of this article, but confirms the significance of citizenship as a body of rights that not only protects against need but also provides meaning to holders of those rights.
It is our aim to focus on citizenship, as a method of inclusion at the local scale and as an expression of social and political participation involving the formulation of new claims as well as the defence of existing rights (Beauregard & Bounds, 2000; Isin, 2000) . Our concern is with the contribution to citizenship by social movements that claim 'the right to the city' in the particular governance context of Barcelona and in the economic environment of fiscal austerity. We have observed that those citizens who claim more transparent political participation also claim substantive social rights. Our analysis draws attention to the limitation of seeing citizenship only as a body of rights granted by the state, and sees the city as a powerful public sphere where new definitions of citizenship emerge. (Boudreau, 2000; Blokland et al.; Garcia, 2006; Holston, 1999; Isin, 2007; Mayer, 2009; Purcell, 2003) . We contextualise a social and political rights discourse as articulated by a political movement, Barcelona en Comu, sprung from earlier civic movements in Barcelona in the aftermath of the 2008 financial and economic crisis.
Citizenship is also 'essential for cultivating civic virtues and democratic values' (Isin & Turner, 2007, 5) . Although T.H. Marshall's evolutionary account of the expansion of citizenship (civic, social and political rights) recognized the civic dimension he emphasised the redistributive capacity of citizenship within capitalism. For him citizenship enhanced 'a growing interest in equality as a principle of social justice ' (1950, 40) . Alexis de Tocqueville observed in the United States a distinctive way of citizen participation and their sense of membership in civil society. In his legacy Isin & Turner see a historical path that has characterised the national identity and incorporation of immigrants in the United States and has given prominence to civic (and human) rights over social rights (Isin & Turner, 2007) . The citizens that Tocqueville observed in Democracy in America exercise civil responsibility and their voluntary and community organizations in towns and villages all contribute to local democracy. His emphasis on that capacity to organise autonomously (outside the orbit of the state) has prompted a wealth of interpretations and debates.
If Tocqueville saw America 'as a nation of joiners' (Kivisto and Faist, 2007, 84) , Robert Putnam took a more pessimist view in his Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital. Putnam's contribution is relevant to our argument since he offers an institutional analysis of degrees of civic engagement and incorporates social capital as part of the explanation of the cooperation and trust that develops with such engagement (Kivisto and Faist, 2007, 85) . The conditions and characteristics of such civic engagement may also help to 'shape' the social action of advocacy groups. In this context the 'civic' assumes a contestatory function (Edwards and Foley, 2001, 6) . Taking our cue from this expanded role of civil society we can see how active participation at grass-root level within and at the margins of the public sphere can strengthen democracy (Mayer, 2009; Eizaguirre et al., 2012 Eizaguirre et al., , 2010 . The case we present illustrates the value of cooperation and trust among members of advocacy groups and social movements (bottom-up organizations) that have worked their way into local governance in a particular institutional environment. Our argument is that the ways in which the local public sphere and governance dynamics have evolved in Barcelona partially explains the achievements of the social movements.
The specific case of Barcelona supports the argument that Marshall's emphasis on welfare and social rights is compatible with the neo-Tocqueville tradition that stresses civic-society participation. Civic engagement was welcomed and promoted, in the recent democratic history of Barcelona, by the local governance coalition that long influenced urban citizenship in the city (Blackeley, 2005; Degen & Garcia, 2012) . Engaging civic groups in the policies of the governing coalition of the 1980s and 1990s also encouraged practices that we call 'bottom-linked' social action. This served not only to provide services and mechanisms of participation to citizens and immigrants but also to organize contestation and struggle against perceived social injustices.
Citizenship is then a process (democracy) and a target (social justice). We take the city (Barcelona) as the political territory with a public sphere in which political and social rights claims historically gave rise to socio-economic redistributive programmes implemented by the city council in the period 1979-2011. From 2011 this governance model was abandoned by a conservative local government. Barcelona is a contemporary example of a city obliged to deal with the consequences of the 2008 financial and economic crisis and in particular with the consequences of national top-down imposition of new modes of regulation affecting life chances (employment) and life conditions (housing and services).
The historical combination of austerity programmes -involving cuts in public services -with the loss of employment, given a market-oriented local government (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) , has fuelled renewed interest in urban politics and social involvement especially among the young, just when many studies were presenting the young generation as passive. This has created a new interest in Spanish housing system is based on wide-spread ownership strongly related to the familistic conservative Southern European welfare culture in which family solidarity is paramount in promoting intergenerational economic support (Ferrera, 2005) . This model has encouraged 'privatised Keynesianism' (Crouch, 2011) for the working class and large sectors of the middle class. It has interacted well with the incremental welfare state expansion that occurred until the 2008 crisis. Family solidarity has grown stronger since then to cope with unemployment and housing needs resulting from the bursting of the housing bubble and from the austerity programmes implemented since 2010. Social housing was never widely extended in Spain, especially if compared with Northern European countries (Pareja-Eastaway & Varo, 2002; Leal, 2010) . This helps to understand the social response to the housing evictions after 2008 (De Weerdt & Garcia, 2015) . While governments used an 'individual approach' the PAH focused on collective responses to social problems (Pradel et al., 2013) . Secondly, the political actions of the PAH influenced governance by pushing for the creation of new mechanisms for collectively negotiating housing debts with financial institutions.
It also politically influenced new local and regional regulations for access to housing for mortgage victims (De Weerdt and Garcia, 2015) . Thirdly, the methods of organization of this movement were instrumental for the Barcelona en The Indignados movement and the PAH movement have, in sum, formulated specific alternative citizenship agendas. These citizenship agendas defined membership beyond formal and legal citizenship status (De Koning et al.,2015) , and gave a strong role to non-state actors in the definition of priorities concerning the defence of social rights. In this regard, the Indignados' new citizenship agenda included a particular claim for more democratic control over decisions that have an impact on citizens' lives.
The Indignados and PAH movements insisted that governing institutions should respect and enforce formal citizenship rights already recognised but implemented only partially or put on hold by the austerity programmes. These movements attest to the resilience of the welfare state by coming to its defence and supporting the precedence of social rights over the needs of the market. Social action also happened around specific welfare services and in working places. For example, the public health sector organized in their hospitals and manifested their strength by demonstrating in the streets. From these actions it can be argued that the defence of social citizenship was very much an urban phenomenon.
In electoral terms, the rise of these movements signified a weakening of There are continuities and differences between the governance model of Barcelona that emerged from 1979 onwards and the current governance situation under BeC. In 1979 local elections brought considerable collaboration between the city council and social movements linked to neighbourhood associations. During the dictatorship's last period these associations had articulated demands for improving neighbourhoods with claims for social and political rights (Andreu, 2015 largely on the creation of mechanisms for intervention by different local actors in decision-making processes but with strong leadership of the public sector in a consensus building environment (Capel, 2007) . Through this model the city council promoted local welfare with the involvement of civil society in the provision of services, such as active advocacy groups and third sector organizations. There is another interpretation of why the city government integrated civil society groups into governance: this refers to the limited financial resources the municipality had for implementing an ambitious social programme (Blackeley, 2005; Wollmann, & Iglesias, 2011) . In any case, the development of this governance model, combining participation of civil society and redistributive policies, strengthened forms of urban citizenship and a Barcelona identity
This model enabled urban civil society groups and social movements to influence the policy agenda in order to implement previous political demands, but in over time it led to the co-optation of some of their leaders and their transformation into members of the political elite, eventually 'abandoning' their loyalties to their grass-roots. The influence by grass-roots movements was, however, strong during the eighties, with important interventions in working class neighbourhoods and in the inner-city: New public spaces were opened substituting old factories or new facilities were provided such as cultural centres, libraries, health centres and primary and secondary schools. The opportunity to host the Olympic Games in 1992 brought massive private and public investments, the latter coming from national and regional levels of government. The Olympic mega-project gathered a wide consensus amongst city actors as it brought major investments in large infrastructures and public spaces that were seen as necessary for the city. Nevertheless the decision-making processes related to the development of such infrastructures diminished the role of citizens and weakened the capacity of neighbourhood associations and other social groups to negotiate new demands with the city council with some exceptions (Degen & Garcia, 2012) .
During the second half of the nineties, in a context of an economic crisis and higher unemployment (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) , the city council changed its governance style towards managerialism dealing with different issues such as gender, urbanism, participation and democracy, environment, or health and were created to stimulate political debate and to propose specific measures in the election campaign. The second kind of commission followed a decentralisation logic, being territorially-based.
Neighbourhood commissions acted following the tradition of the neighbourhood movements of the city collected neighbourhoods claims and ensured the 5 DESC is a think tank on the issue of citizenship led by a senior ex-city councillor, and social scientist who has published articles and books on social rights and urban citizenship.
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A deep empirical analysis of the social background of those participating in the movement is still pending. Nevertheless, observation of different commissions shows the strong role that academics, most of them young researchers in precarious job situations played in the thematic debates during the elaboration of the program. The role of the technical staff is relevant as it provided inside information, especially on issues linked to transparency. Finally, people,already involved in debates during the 15M movement, were also involved with the platform to different degrees, from simple participation in commissions to being part of the coordination committees. mechanism allowed to incorporate in the electoral program proposals from advocacy groups and social movements. Following Diani (2001: 209) we see the political impact of these groups on policy design and on the activities at all stages of 'the political'. We also see a cultural impact on the processes of production and reproduction of moral standards, information, knowledge and life practices. The objective of political impact was not only to attain power at the local level but to propose the transformation of policy processes. In terms of cultural impact, the platform tried to frame policy debates proposing different moral standards and hoping to carry these over into policy implementation. These objectives recall debates already occurring during the eighties, when the previous redistributive model was developed by the socialist-left coalition. In both historical instances a 'bottom-linked' articulation between civil society, social movements and institutions developed in Barcelona. Table 1 shows some initiatives included in the electoral program of BeC and the specific advocacy groups that were active before the political project was articulated to win the local elections. The strength of the connection between BeC and these groups and social movements varies. In some cases, such as the activists claiming democratic regeneration, there was a strong involvement in the political program of BeC, whereas only a few members of other networks were involved (although their claims were also included in the final program). 
Source: authors' own elaboration
The internal organization and political decisions concerning who was going to participate directly in the election of the council were more complex.
Groups and commissions in BeC were headed by a coordination committee (formed by the leaders of the platform) and an executive committee that deals with internal issues (also formed by the leaders). Members of both committees were elected and their decisions endorsed by a plenary assembly, but they had a high degree of autonomy. The coordination committee had the freedom to manage all proposals, giving coherence to the program by accepting or modifying certain measures. They had autonomy to negotiate the integration of traditional political parties in the platform. The initial aim of the platform leaders was to integrate party members into the structure of the platform without formal negotiation with the party apparatus. Even though this was possible in terms of developing the program, with militants from different parties participating individually in the thematic and territorial commissions, this was not possible for the negotiation of the list and order of candidates. Finally, a more traditional process of negotiating to form the coalition took shape, and the electoral list of candidates was agreed with left-wing political parties (Podemos, Procés Constituent, Iniciativa per Catalunya-Verds, Esquerra Unida I Alternativa and Equo) 7 . This negotiation occasioned tensions because of the democratic organisation of the platform and the openness of decision-making, with some participants feeling that the schemes of traditional political parties were being reproduced which could lead to co-optation and weakening influence of advocacy groups and social movements in the political movement. Nevertheless the final electoral list was validated through primaries conducted via electronic poll.
Towards a new citizenship agenda?
BeC finished first in the elections of May 2015 with a simple majority and a redistributive and participatory program. The new left-wing governing coalition has followed a path similar to that of the governing coalition of the years 1980-1990s, with some differences. One is of political culture and program, the other concerns the capacity to govern. As to political culture, the current political agenda involves renewing participation and transparency in policy-making to strengthen political rights and promoting changes in the hegemonic economic model to minimize the effects of economic growth on such rights. The idea is to defend social rights through the implementation of an emergency plan (25 out of a total of 35 policy measures) to ameliorate the situation of vulnerability of hundreds of families:, redistribution is back on Barcelona's government agenda.
As for political capacity, BeC does not have a stable majority to implement measures and the government needs to establish alliances with other groups 8 .
The following table gives some idea of the electoral base supporting BeC and why there is such a strong emphasis on vulnerable citizens. The left-wing party Iniciativa per Catalunya-Verds had continuously supported socialist governments between 1979 and 2011. The participation of this party in the coalition brought greater knowledge of the organisation of the city council and financial resources, but the collaboration generated reservations as the party was seen as an 'old politics' organisation by some members of BeC. Planned actions aim not only to make the city more socially just but also to change the relations between public and private actors in decision makingAs regards housing, for instance, the city council has sought such measures as already proposed by the anti-eviction movement. They include the creation of a negotiating table with banks in order to find alternative solutions to mortgage executions and to use non-occupied housing stock owned by banks for social housing provision. In parallel, the local government is increasing the stock of public social housing through more public investment. Likewise, as regards water provision, the city council foresees the re-municipalisation of the local water company.
Despite this, the outcomes of efforts towards creating more social justice have been uneven. Private actors have manifested open disagreement with that part of the BeC program. And there is lack of institutional support at other levels of government to implement them. This is the case of ensuring the right to adequate food, the right to health, to mobility, to a basic supply of water, gas and electricity, or to a municipal and complementary basic-income, all of them included in the Action plan of BeC that depends on financial resources from the regional or the national government.
The new local government also wants to reinforce political citizenship in the sense of strengthening transparency and greater involvement of citizens in decision-making processes. This includes making public all the meetings of the mayor with different actors and offering better information on public spending and auditing agencies that depend on the city council (such as the planning publicprivate company Barcelona Regional). They aim is to prevent corruption. were implemented after four months in power (most of them related to social needs) and 10 were under study or early development 9 . The strong political fragmentation in the city council, with Barcelona en Comú having only 11 out of 41 seats, has forced the city government to negotiate and to limit some of the original proposals. In spite of that BeC is firm in defending its citizenship agenda wanting to prioritize the 'common good' over private interests. In this regard, BeC has strengthened the discourse based on social and political rights and the 'right to the city' renovating and recapturing the original model of urban citizenship shaped during the eighties, when local forms of welfare were developed with strong support of civil society.
Conclusions
Citizenship has become in the new century a meaningful horizon for political imagination (Hansen, 2015) . Finally, the new local government has suffered limitations imposed by multi-level governance. The local scale allows the alliance between different movements and organizations to formulate a local political agenda, but the possibility to implement redistributive policies at the local level is constrained by a lack of competenc and resources. The capacity of these movements to scale up to other levels of government is limited as the construction of alliances and confluences is strongly rooted mainly or only at the local level. This is, probably, one of the most salient limitations of urban citizenship. In this regard, the case of Barcelona indicate that it is easier for these new political movements to have a cultural impact as they put forward new citizenship agendas than to make a clear political impact. This has yet to be assessed by history.
